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Religious Freedom: Russian Constitutional 
Principles—Historical and Contemporary 
Dr. Nikolas K. Gvosdev ∗  
No constitution exists in a vacuum. Its provisions are constantly 
being reinterpreted and applied against the backdrop of specific cul-
tures, definitions, and expectations. In the United States, individual 
choice has become the benchmark by which the validity of decisions 
is measured. As sociologist Christian Smith, of the University of 
North Carolina, notes: 
For moderns—perhaps especially modern Americans—the ultimate 
criterion of identity and lifestyle validity is individual choice. It is by 
choosing a product, a mate, a lifestyle, or an identity that one 
makes it one’s very own, personal, special, and meaningful—not 
“merely” something one inherits or assumes.1 
In contrast, constitutional principles in Russia have been inter-
preted not simply through the prism of the individual, but through 
the matrix of relationships that create and maintain society. 
Constitutional scholar V.E. Chirkin observes, “a ‘constitutional 
right’ regulates the system of foundational ties in the relationships: 
society—the state—the collective—the individual.”2 
The Constitution of the Russian Federation, promulgated in 
1993, is a “mixed” document, drawing from the Anglo-American, 
continental European, and Russian constitutional traditions. As such, 
it represents a “collision of legal cultures.”3 This is especially true 
when dealing with issues of religious freedom. Both the Constitution  
 
 
 
 ∗ Associate Director, J.M. Dawson Institute of Church-State Studies at Baylor Univer-
sity. 
 1. Richard John Neuhaus, To Choose and Be Chosen, FIRST THINGS, Oct. 2000, at 86 
(quoting Christian Smith). 
 2. V.E. CHIRKIN, KONSTITUTSIONNOE PRAVO ROSSII 2 (2000). 
 3. I. Bogdanovskaia, The Constitutional Court of Russia: The Hard Way to the “Rule-
of-Law” State, Address presented at the Fifth World Congress of the International Association 
of Constitutional Law, Constitutionalism, Universalism, and Democracy, Rotterdam (July 12–
16, 1999). 
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itself, as well as related legislation, as Alexei Krindatch pointed out, is 
the result of a 
compromise between different approaches to a desirable model of 
church-state relations in post-Soviet Russia represented by various 
social forces . . . .  
 [Also,] there was a compromise between the “Western” (or 
American) vision of the term “religious freedom” . . . and the cur-
rent Russian social and political realities . . . .  
. . . .  
 The combination of the above mentioned factors . . . resulted 
unfortunately in the eclectic and vague character of the entire law 
and of its particular articles. This allows for a broad range of legal 
interpretations from very liberal to very restrictive.4 
When looking at the question of religious freedom in Russia, 
therefore, one must not only examine the relevant constitutional 
provisions, but also the ways in which these provisions are translated 
in a given cultural and historical context.5 This is especially important 
if there are contradictions or disagreements within the body of the 
text. One cannot also neglect long-held societal attitudes, especially 
when such attitudes are reflected in the way constitutional provisions 
are interpreted and executed by judges and officials. 
I. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE RUSSIAN CONSTITUTION 
By the mechanism of a popular referendum, the present Consti-
tution of the Russian Federation was adopted on December 12, 
1993, and immediately entered into force. In addition, all “laws and 
other legislative acts in operation on the territory of the Russian Fed-
eration prior to the entry into force of the present Constitution are 
 
 4. Alexei Krindatch, Comment by Alexei Krindatch (April 13, 1988) (visited Jan. 16, 
2001) <http://www.geocities.com/~iarf/russialaw.html>. Krindatch is a member of the Rus-
sian Academy of Sciences as well as the International Association for Religious Freedom. 
 5. In August 1997, Patriarch Alexis II of Moscow, the head of the Russian Orthodox 
Church, made a vehement protest against the forcing of “North American norms” of religious 
freedom upon Russia, and said that any legislation should take into consideration the “national 
traditions” of Russia. Patriarkh Moskovskii i Vseia Rusi Aleksii II Vystupil Protiv Naviazivaniia 
na Rossii ‘Severoamerikanskikh Norm’ V Voprosakh Svobody Sovesti, ITAR-TASS PRAVOSLAVIE V 
ROSSII, (Aug. 28, 1997) (visited May 1, 2001) <http://www.or.ru>. 
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retained to the point that they do not contradict the Constitution of 
the Russian Federation.”6 The current Constitution, therefore, is not 
bound by any previous fundamental laws or acts and, according to 
Article 15(1), “possesses the highest juridical power and direct action 
and is applicable throughout the territory of the Russian Federation. 
Laws and other legislative acts, adopted in the Russian Federation, 
should not contradict the Constitution of the Russian Federation.” 
In addition to elevating the national Constitution to a place of su-
premacy over all other laws in the Russian Federation, including local 
and regional legislative acts, Article 15(4) goes on to recognize the 
priority of international treaties over domestic law, and in the event 
that a Russian law conflicts with a treaty provision, “the rule of the 
international agreement shall apply.”7 
It is important to realize, however, that the Russian Constitution 
of 1993 does not represent the final apotheosis of constitutional and 
legal thought in post-Soviet Russia. While it is true that “liberal 
views, despite numerous shortcomings and ambiguities, nevertheless 
triumphed in the Russian constitution adopted on 12 December 
1993,” Richard Sakwa correctly points out that 
 [t]he making of constitutions in post-communist countries has 
often been likened to overhauling a ship in mid-ocean. This some-
what understates the problem: in most other countries at least the 
destination or purpose is known, whereas in Russia there is no con-
sensus over the type of polity that is to emerge out of the constitu-
tional process. In other words, there is no agreement over what pre-
cisely constitutes an ethical state or sustains the moral attributes of the 
citizen living in this state.8 
This uncertainty is reflected, to some extent, not only in the 
various articles of the Constitution which touch on religious free-
dom, but also in the ways in which such articles can be interpreted. 
Do such clauses translate into “religious freedom,” particularly as 
that term has been understood by Americans and American constitu-
tional jurisprudence? While a surface reading may lead us to that 
conclusion, there are differences in interpretation and translation that  
 
 
 6. KONST. RF art. 15 (1993). 
 7. Id. art. 15(4). 
 8. Richard Sakwa, The Struggle for the Constitution in Russia and the Triumph of Ethi-
cal Individualism, 48 STUD. IN E. EUR. THOUGHT 115, 115 (1996) (emphasis added). 
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can, in fact, lead to significant limitations being placed on the right 
of religious freedom to be exercised in contemporary Russia.9 
The 1993 Russian Constitution directly addresses religious free-
dom in two contexts. Discussion of religious freedom first appears in 
Section One, Chapter One, which addresses the constitutional order 
of the state. Article 14 declares: “1. The Russian Federation is a 
secular state. No religion may be established in the capacity of a state 
or mandatory [religion]. 2. Religious associations are separated from 
the state and equal before the law.”10 
The second reference to religious freedom is in Chapter Two, 
which deals with individual rights, in Article 28: 
To each is guaranteed freedom of conscience, freedom of profes-
sion of faith, including the right to profess [or “confess”] individu-
ally or in conjunction with others any religion or to profess none, 
to freely choose, have and spread religious and other beliefs [or 
convictions] and to act in concert with them.11 
Religious freedom is indirectly impacted in two other areas of the 
Russian Constitution. Article 29(2) prohibits any sort of “propa-
ganda or agitation” based on, among other things, “religious hatred 
and enmity” and bars propaganda that advocates any sort of superi-
ority of one group over another, including proclaimed superiority on 
religious grounds.12 Article 55(3) mandates that human rights may 
be restricted by federal law in those instances where such action is 
necessary to “protect the fundamentals of the constitutional order, 
public morals, health, the rights and the legal interests of other  
 
 
 
 9. See, e.g., American Interpretations of Religious Freedom Not Always Global Standard 
in Determining What Constitutes Religious Freedom, a press release issued by the J.M. Dawson 
Institute of Church-State Studies (Baylor University), Sept. 25, 2000 (pointing out that the 
State Department report assumes that constitutional guarantees which speak about the equality 
of religious associations are to be understood as mandating equality among all religions). 
 10. KONST. RF art. 14. 
 11. Id. art. 28. Article 28 of the Russian Constitution is based, to a large extent, on Ar-
ticle 9(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights, which reads: “Everyone has the 
right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his 
religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or pri-
vate, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.” See 
complete text of the European Convention on Human Rights at <http://conventions. 
coe.int/treaty/EN/Treaties/html/005.htm.>. 
 12. KONST. RF 29(2). 
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persons, to guarantee the defense of the country and the security of 
the state.”13 
Taken collectively, these constitutional articles do not amount to 
a clear-cut guarantee of “religious freedom” in the American under-
standing of the term. That is to say, there is no explicit provision that 
guarantees that religions as corporate institutions have an automatic 
right to exist in society, to seek out members, and to guide the be-
liefs and actions of their adherents.14 What, then, is precisely guaran-
teed? 
Article 14(1) is phrased as a negative right; that is to say, the 
state cannot impose the practice and confession of a particular faith 
upon the individual. It guarantees to the citizen that the government 
will not endorse any particular creed and thus may be understood as 
the right of the citizen to be free from religion; it does not, however, 
guarantee freedom of religion. In the Western understanding of the 
term, “secular” implies that a government or state favors no particu-
lar religion and thus tolerates all faiths. However, I would argue that 
 
 13. Id. art. 55(3). 
 14. The First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States says nothing about 
an individual’s right to believe. Instead, it speaks of the institution of religion and prohibits the 
state from either “respecting an establishment” thereof or “prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof.” U.S. CONST. amend I. The Supreme Court decision in Cantwell v. Connecticut clari-
fied in greater detail what is meant by freedom of religion, noting that it consists both of the 
“freedom to believe and freedom to act.” 310 U.S. 296, 303–04 (1940). The Court main-
tained that “[t]he first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct 
remains subject to regulation for the protection of society.” Id. However, the Court was clear 
in pointing out that the government, even in trying to ensure the good order and protection of 
society, “may not . . . wholly deny the right to preach or to disseminate religious views.” Id. at 
304. It further pointed out that such regulations or restrictions on the right to act had to be 
“general and nondiscriminatory” in nature. Id. Finally, in Cantwell the Court also struck down 
a Connecticut statute that required religious organizations to be certified as such to engage in 
solicitation. The Court was quite clear that such a statute gave an official the authority to: 
determine whether the cause is a religious one. . . . His decision to issue or refuse it 
involves appraisal of facts, the exercise of judgment, and the formation of an opin-
ion. He is authorized to withhold his approval if he determines that the cause is not 
a religious one. Such a censorship of religion as the means of determining its right 
to survive is a denial of liberty. . . .  
  . . . . 
  . . . The State is . . . free to regulate the time and manner of solicitation gener-
ally, in the interest of public safety, peace, comfort or convenience. But to condition 
the solicitation of aid for the perpetuation of religious views or systems upon a li-
cense, the grant of which rests in the exercise of a determination by state authority 
as to what is a religious cause, is to lay a forbidden burden upon the exercise of lib-
erty. . . . 
Id. at 305–07. 
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one can maintain that the term used in the Russian Constitution, 
“svetskoe gosudarstvo,” and translated into English as “secular state” 
or “secular government,” carries with it not the understanding of 
secular as “religiously neutral” but rather the connotation of “tem-
poral.” That is to say, a “svetskoe gosudarstvo” is one where the state 
does not interfere in matters of the church (e.g. government selec-
tion of hierarchs or determination of dogma) and concerns itself with 
temporal, earthly matters; this does not necessarily imply, however, 
that society as a whole is religiously neutral. Instead, society can ex-
press its preferences in religious matters through non-governmental 
means. 
Article 14(2) is problematic because it states that “religious asso-
ciations,” rather than religions or faiths, are equal before the law. In 
other words, groups of believers do not automatically constitute an 
organization with legal personality. Since both the term itself, as well 
as the procedure by which such associations are formed, are left un-
defined in the Constitution, the power is left to the state to define by 
enabling legislation precisely what constitutes a “religious associa-
tion,” and, in fact, the 1997 law “On Freedom of Conscience and 
On Religious Associations” seeks to do just that.15 Article I of the 
Law states clearly that its purpose is to “regulate . . . the legal status 
of religious associations.”16 Thus, by shifting the basis of legal equal-
ity from religions to associations, it is constitutionally possible to dif-
ferentiate legally among different faiths based on their status of in-
corporation as a legal entity, as the 1997 law clearly does. 
The personal right expressed in Article 28 is likewise flawed in 
formulation. It is clear that an individual is not granted the right to 
“freedom of religion,” and, more importantly, religions themselves 
have no right to exist and freely operate under the Russian Constitu-
tion. Rather, the individual is guaranteed the right to freedom of 
 
 15. This is, after all, the common European juridical practice, that a state has a certain 
degree of latitude to define how an abstract human right is to be translated into actual practice. 
In the Kokkinakis v. Greece decision of the European Court of Human Rights, for example, the 
justices noted that a “certain margin of appreciation is to be left to the Contracting States” to 
determine how the rights to freedom of conscience and expression are to be manifested and 
exercised in society. 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 21 (1993). In Kokkinakis, the European 
Court addressed the conviction of a Jehovah’s Witness for proselytism in Greece, to determine 
whether prohibitions on evangelization violated Greece’s obligations under the European 
Convention to defend religious freedom. 
 16. FEDERAL’NYI ZAKON O SVOBODE SOVESTI I O RELIGIOZNYKH OB’EDINENIIAKH 3 
(1998) [hereinafter FEDERAL’NYI ZAKON]. 
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conscience and profession in a liturgical context, as rendered by the 
Russian term veroispovedaniia. One cannot equate this article with 
guarantees for the “free exercise of religion.” The Russian Constitu-
tion focuses on individual “confession” (ispovedaniia), which does 
not carry the same connotation.17 To “confess” one’s faith is primar-
ily a liturgical act, something done in worship; whereas “exercise” 
carries a broader meaning, not simply the freedom to worship, but to 
carry out a whole host of non-liturgical, non-worship related func-
tions. Moreover, Article 28, even when providing for a person to 
“confess” and “act upon” his beliefs in conjunction with others, does 
not automatically define such corporate activity as fulfilling the defi-
nition of a “religious association” as contained in Article 14.18 
A similar problem exists with the constitutional provision that al-
lows a person to “spread” his or her beliefs. Once again, the focal 
point is the individual, rather than a religious corporation. The Con-
stitution guarantees the right of an individual to express, explain, and 
discuss his or her “opinions.” It does not, however, automatically ex-
tend the right to “spread” beliefs to all religious groups. Moreover, 
this clause says nothing about the right of religious corporations to 
spread beliefs in a broad fashion (e.g. through the operation of or-
gans of mass media or by renting of public facilities). The 1997 Law 
seems to indicate that informal groups of religious believers who are 
not registered under the law as a juridical corporation (and thus en-
joy the status of a “religious organization”) have no rights to prop-
erty or status other than those possessed by the group’s members as 
individual citizens.19 Moreover, the individual’s right to freedom of 
 
 17. This distinction comes across very clearly in the classic Russian prayers, where a dis-
tinction is often drawn between “confession” of faith and “execution” of action. In one of the 
morning prayers, God is asked to assist the petitioner to “carry out your will (tvoriti voliu 
Tvoiu)” and to “sing to you in a heartfelt confession” (peti Tia vo ispovedanii serdechnem). See 
also SOKRASHCHENNYI MOLITVOSLOV 6 (1850). Such a distinction can clearly be seen in the 
initial translations of the Psalms; “ispovedaniia” is linked to liturgical praise, thanksgiving, and 
confession (as in Psalm 136), while “ispolnenie” is connected to activity, to carrying something 
out, to fulfillment (as in Psalm 103). In fact, the glossary attached to the Psalter defines the 
verb “ispovedatisia” as “to glorify, the giving of praise” and “the recognition of sin.” The 
overwhelming sense of the word “ispovedaniia”, therefore, is one’s prayerful statement of be-
lief, rather than any sense of “exercise” of that belief. See PSALTIR 279, 373, 443 (1994). 
 18. In interpreting Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the Euro-
pean Court on Human Rights, in the Kokkinakis decision, pointed out that “religious freedom 
is primarily a matter of individual conscience” as described in that article. Kokkinakis, 260 Eur. 
Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 17. 
 19. FEDERAL’NYI ZAKON, supra note 16, at 6. 
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speech, and the freedom to spread information and views, guaran-
teed in Article 29 of the Constitution, is nonetheless limited by the 
vague phrase that such rights must be exercised only “by legal 
means.”20 The state is thus free to set out in enabling legislation pre-
cise limits on the abilities of individual citizens to engage in public 
discourse. Moreover, Article 29(2) already contains explicit restric-
tions of the right to free speech should that speech be deemed to be 
hateful or promote superiority on any type of grounds, including re-
ligious beliefs. 
Presumably, the individual has the right to personal beliefs and 
to make “confession” of those beliefs by himself or with others in the 
privacy of one’s home or in privately owned property. Nowhere does 
Article 28 speak of any institutional rights possessed by religions per 
se. This clause contains no guarantees that religious groups may own 
property, maintain corporate institutions, or function as social or-
ganizations. It “privatizes” religious expression and provides no 
automatic entry into the public square for religions as corporate, so-
cial institutions. Nor does Article 30 of the Constitution, which rec-
ognizes the right to “ob’edinenie” (association, organization) and 
states that “the freedom of action of public associations is guaran-
teed,”21 provide much assistance. Lacking concrete standards, the 
“bridge” that transforms a private group’s “confession of faith” into 
a social organization that is in fact a juridical person under the law, 
capable of owning property and functioning as a public institution, is 
left up to the state to decide in separate articles of legislation. This is 
precisely what is done in the 1997 law. In defining what is meant by 
the term “religious association,” Article 7 creates the category of a 
“religious group” (religioznaia gruppa) that consists of no less than 
ten citizens of the Russian Federation who have voluntarily assem-
bled for “the goals of common confession (sovmestnogo ispovedaniia) 
and the dissemination of the faith.” However, a religious group 
functions without official registration as a juridical person, and thus 
remains an informal, private group of citizens. It is thus differenti-
ated from a religious organization, which is a registered religious as-
sociation that enjoys the status of a legal corporation and can own 
property and exist in society as an independent actor.22 For a private 
 
 20. KONST. RF art. 29. 
 21. Id. art. 29(2). 
 22. FEDERAL’NYI ZAKON, supra note 16, at 6. 
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gathering of citizens assembled for religious “confession” to trans-
form itself into a recognized public organization requires registration 
with the state, and the group must fulfill the proviso that it has main-
tained a corporate identity and continuity in meeting for fifteen 
years.23 
The 1997 Law gives to the state the ability to determine which 
groups constitute authentic religious groups and which do not. Arti-
cle 12 of the legislation provides for denial of registration if “the or-
ganization that is being created is not recognized in the category of 
[being] religious.” Thus, while citizens may be free to “hold beliefs” 
and to “confess” them, it is the state which determines what is, and 
what is not, a religion.24 More ominous is Article 14 of the 1997 
Law, which lays out the procedure “for the liquidation of a religious 
organization and the prohibition of the operation of a religion or-
ganization or religious group.” While no one argues the point that a 
society has the right to outlaw certain acts and that freedom of relig-
ion is not an absolute cover to justify any and all deeds, the 1997 
Law permits the state to extinguish legally the operation of any par-
ticular religion on a variety of grounds, such as “destroying public 
security” or contributing to “the destruction of the family.”25 
The problem, in the end, is that Russian jurisprudence does not, 
as of yet, possess a comprehensive ruling as to what constitutes “reli-
gious freedom” as defined in the Constitution. Most rulings, up to 
this point, have concerned technical issues regarding implementation 
of existing laws, rather than putting forward any broad principles re-
garding religious freedom. Nor is it entirely clear that an appeal to 
pan-European jurisprudence, especially with regard to rulings 
handed down from the European Court of Human Rights,26 would  
 
 
 
 23. Id. at 7. 
 24. Id. at 10. 
 25. Id. at 10–11. This is in direct contrast to the American constitutional tradition, 
whereby a religion itself cannot be proscribed even if it holds as any of its tenets of belief or 
practice matters which are deemed illegal under the law. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 
145 (1878). As the Court noted, “Laws . . . cannot interfere with mere religious belief and 
opinions, they may with practices.” Id. at 166. 
 26. One might make the argument that the European Court’s rulings, which seek to 
define the meaning of Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (which deals 
with religious freedom), would be relevant to the Russian case since the wording used in the 
Convention is not entirely dissimilar from Article 28 of the Russian Constitution. 
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automatically lead to any reversals of Russian state policies in the en-
forcement of the 1997 law.27 
Therefore, it is only through deliberate constitutional revision 
that these loopholes can be closed. One proposal would be to re-
place the language in Article 14.2 from “religious associations” to 
read simply “religions,” so that the clause would say, “All religions 
are separated from the state and equal before the law.” This would 
then connect directly to the clause in Article 28 that says a person is 
free to confess “any religion.” Another solution would be to reword 
Article 28 so that the individual or collective practice of a religion is 
defined explicitly as a “religious association.” Article 28 could also be 
strengthened by not only guaranteeing freedom of conscience and 
belief for the individual but also guaranteeing the free exercise of re-
ligion itself. Perhaps an additional clause could be added, so that af-
ter the recitation of the individual’s right to freedom of belief, a sec-
ond phrase would state, “Religious activities are protected by the 
state” or some other such wording that would make it clear that not  
 
 
 
 27. The European Court, for example, passed over without comment the Austrian sys-
tem of classifying religious organizations into “recognized” religious communities versus reli-
gious “groups” which do not enjoy such recognition. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Austria, 255 Eur. 
Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 56, ¶ 22 (1993). As previously noted, the European Court, in interpreting 
Article 9, did acknowledge that while people have a right to “manifest” their faith publicly, 
Article 9 is primarily a guarantee for the individual’s right of conscience rather than a general 
guarantee of freedom of religion. Moreover, the court has continued to recognize that a state 
does have the right to “place restrictions on this freedom in order to reconcile the interests of 
the various groups and ensure that everyone’s beliefs are respected.” See Kokkinakis v. Greece, 
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 17–19, ¶¶ 31, 33 (1993). In a key dissenting opinion to the Kokki-
nakis case, submitted by Judge N. Valticos, and likely to be seized upon by proponents of the 
1997 law in Russia, Article 9 is interpreted in a much narrower fashion, that it is “designed 
solely to protect the religion of individuals and not their right to attack that of others.” In his 
opinion, “[s]omeone who proselytizes seeks to convert others; he does not confine himself to 
affirming his faith but seeks to change that of others to his own” and that active missionary 
work goes beyond the right given in Article 9 to “manifest” one’s religion. See Kokkinakis, at 
30–31 (Valticos, J., dissenting). The recently-handed down decision in the case of the Jewish 
Liturgical Association Cha’are Shalom ve Tsedek v. France, No. 27417/95 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 
27, 2000) <http://www.dhcour.coe/fr/hudoc>, on the one hand, does contain a strong af-
firmation that religious groups collectively exercise the individual rights guaranteed in Article 
9. See id. slip op. at 22, ¶ 72 (stating, “[t]he Court considers . . . that an ecclesiastical or reli-
gious body may, as such, exercise on behalf of its adherents the rights guaranteed by Article 9 
of the Convention.”). Overall, however, the Court reinforced the power of the state to extend 
or deny recognition of religious bodies, in this case, allowing the French government to deny 
to this Jewish organization the right to ritually slaughter animals because an existing group 
enjoying state recognition already performs such functions. 
5GVO-FIN.DOC 6/25/01  9:11 PM 
511] Russian Constitutional Principles 
 521 
only individuals, but also religions as corporate entities, have a right 
to exist, disseminate their views, and seek adherents.28 
 
 28. This is not simply an issue for Russia, but for many nations in the world where such 
loopholes exist. Missionary work and corporate religious activity is banned or restricted, either 
directly or indirectly, in a number of countries whose own Constitutions contain similar lan-
guage (and who are signatories to international human rights treaties) on the grounds that 
while a person’s individual right to freedom of belief is protected, the religion to which he or 
she belongs has no right to engage in public activity. In a country like Mauritania, for example, 
freedom of belief is understood in a private sense, as the following excerpt from the 2000 State 
Department report on religious freedom makes clear: 
  Shari’a (Islamic law), proclaimed the law of the land under a previous govern-
ment in 1983, includes the Koranic prohibition against apostasy; however, it has 
never been codified in civil law or enforced. The small number of known converts 
from Islam suffered no social ostracism, and there were no reports of societal or 
governmental attempts to punish them.  
  Although there is no specific legal prohibition against proselytizing by non-
Muslims, in practice the Government implements the prohibition against proselytiz-
ing by non-Muslims through the use of Article 11 of the Press Act, which bans the 
publication of any material that is against Islam or contradicts or otherwise threatens 
Islam. The Government views any attempts by  Christians to convert Muslims as 
undermining society. Foreign Christian NGO’s limit their activities to humanitarian 
and development assistance. Christians in the foreign community and the few Chris-
tian citizens practice their religion openly and freely. Under Article 11 of the Press 
Law, the Government may restrict the importation, printing, or public distribution 
of Bibles or other non-Islamic religious literature, and in practice Bibles are neither 
printed nor publicly sold in the country. However, the possession of Bibles and 
other Christian religious materials in private homes is not illegal, and there appears 
to be no shortage of Bibles and other religious publications among the small Chris-
tian community. 
  . . . .  
  There are several foreign, Christian NGO’s active in humanitarian and devel-
opmental work in the country. They practice their religion openly, but respect the 
proscription against proselytizing. 
BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2000 
ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: MAURITANIA (Sept. 5, 2000) 
(visited Apr. 27, 2001) <http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/irf/irf_rpt/ 
irf_mauritan.html>. Similarly, in Singapore, the State Department noted: 
  The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and the Government gen-
erally respects this right in practice; however, the Government bans some religious 
groups. The Constitution provides that every citizen or person in the country has a 
constitutional right to profess, practice, or propagate his religious belief as long as 
such activities do not breach any other laws relating to public order, public health, 
or morality.  
  There is no state religion. However, all religious groups are subject to govern-
ment scrutiny and must be registered legally under the Societies Act. The 1990 
Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act, which was prompted by actions that the 
Government perceived as threats to religious harmony, including aggressive and “in-
sensitive” proselytizing and “the mixing of religion and politics,” gave the Govern-
ment the power to restrain leaders and members of religious groups and institutions 
from carrying out political activities, criticizing the Government, creating “ill-will” 
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II. TRADITIONAL ATTITUDES TOWARD RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN 
RUSSIAN POLITICAL THOUGHT 
In addition to the loopholes within the Russian Constitution re-
garding the protection of individual religious liberty, the very phras-
ing of these articles—couched in terms of Western individualism—
clashes with deeply-rooted historical and constitutional attitudes in 
Russia itself with regard to how “religious freedom” is to be under-
stood and applied. Through the agency of the Greek Nomocanon,29 
ancient Russia was exposed to the idea that religious identity is a 
hallmark of one’s membership in the social community and the po-
litical state.30 Therefore, religious freedom in Russia was historically 
understood in a communal rather than individual manner. Thus, the 
concept of the “genetic” or “national” believer, that people should 
adhere “to a religion traditional to their family or nation,” carries a 
great deal of currency in contemporary post-Soviet Russia.31 This is 
 
between religious groups or carrying out subversive activities. The act also prohibits 
judicial review of its enforcement or of any possible denial of rights arising from 
it. . . .  
  . . . .  
  . . . while the Government does not prohibit evangelical activities in practice, it 
discourages activities that might upset the balance of intercommunal relations. 
BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2000 
ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: SINGAPORE (Sept. 5, 2000) 
(visited Apr. 27, 2001) <http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/irf/irf_rpt/ 
irf_singapor.html>. 
 29. The Nomocanon was a collection of both the legislation promulgated by the Church 
as well as secular laws that affected religious matters. It served as the primary code for church-
state relations in the East until the early modern period. In Russia it was often referred to as 
the Kormachaia Kniga. 
 30. The 6th Novella of the Emperor Justinian lays out the ideological principle of sym-
phonia, the harmony that should exist between church and state, as two authorities co-existing 
within a single commonwealth: 
There are two great gifts which God, in his love for man, has granted from on high: 
the priesthood and the imperial dignity. The first serves divine things, while the lat-
ter directs and administers human affairs; both, however, proceed from the same 
origin and adorn the life of mankind. Hence, nothing should be such a source of 
care to the emperors as the dignity of the priests, since it is for their (imperial) wel-
fare that they constantly implore God. For, if the priesthood is in every way free 
from blame and possesses access to God, and if the emperors administer equitably 
and judiciously the state entrusted to their care, general harmony will result and 
whatever is beneficial will be bestowed upon the human race. 
Quoted in JOHN MEYENDORFF, IMPERIAL UNITY AND CHRISTIAN DIVISIONS 209 (1989) 
(original Greek omitted). 
 31. R. Baltanov and G. Baltanova, Islam, Christianity, and New Religious Trends in 
Tatarstan: The Issue of Conversion, in THE CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM FRONTIER: CHAOS, CLASH, 
5GVO-FIN.DOC 6/25/01  9:11 PM 
511] Russian Constitutional Principles 
 523 
especially true when a particular faith or creed is felt to be a defining 
characteristic of membership in the national community.32 Is Russian 
Orthodoxy, therefore, an intrinsic part of Russian nationhood and, as 
such, part of the “social contract” that defines the Russian people, or 
at least the ethnic Russians (russkie) who form the core ethnos of the 
Russian Federation? In 1997, for example, President Boris Yeltsin 
“emphasized the unique role of Orthodoxy in the thousand-year his-
tory of the Russian state and in the contemporary transformation of 
Russian society.”33 Similarly, the Preamble to the 1997 Law “On 
Freedom of Conscience and on Religious Associations” explicitly 
recognized “the special role played by Orthodoxy in the history of 
Russia, in the establishment of its spirituality and culture.”34 
Constitutionally, the federal government, along with republican 
and local governments, is prohibited from creating a state religion 
and is barred from showing preferential treatment to any particular 
religious association. However, the federal government, under Arti-
cle 71, is empowered to undertake policies designed to lead to the 
“cultural and national development of the Russian Federation.”35 Ar-
ticle 72 gives shared responsibility to federal and local authorities to 
“protect monuments of history and culture” and to handle “all ques-
tions of upbringing [development], education, science, culture, 
physical culture and sport.”36 Given the close tie between traditional 
religion and national culture, therefore, the state has a great deal of 
maneuvering room to promote and prefer particular faiths under the 
guise of supporting, defending, and enhancing cultural life, from the 
disbursement of state funds for the construction of churches (desig-
nated as historic monuments or landmarks of national culture) to the 
 
OR DIALOGUE? 88 (Jorgen S. Nielsen ed., 1998). 
 32. Article 9 of the Constitution of the Republic of Georgia, for example, declares that 
the “state recognises the special importance of the Georgian Orthodox Church in Georgian 
history but simultaneously declares complete freedom of religious belief and confessions, as 
well as independence of the church from the state.” GEOR. CONST. art. 9 (1991) <http:// 
www.parliament.ge.parl/L_A/S_P/CONSTITUTION/law.htm>. 
 33. Sostialsia telefonyi razgovor prezidenta RF i Sviateshogo Patriarkha Po Povodu Zakona 
O Svobode Sovesti, ITAR-TASS, PRAVOSLAVIE V ROSSII, (Aug. 1, 1997) <http://www.or.ru>. 
See also BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2000 
ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: RUSSIA (Sept. 5, 2000) (visited 
Apr. 27, 2001) <http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/irf/irf_rpt/irf_russia. 
html> [hereinafter 2000 ANNUAL REPORT: RUSSIA]. 
 34. FEDERAL’NYI ZAKON, supra note 16, at 3. 
 35. KONST. RF art. 71. 
 36. Id. art. 72. 
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teaching of specific religious dogmas and practices in schools (revival 
of traditional mores).37 Legal establishment may be prohibited, but 
social or national establishment is not. Based on how one interprets 
Article 3 of the Russian Constitution, vesting “the people” as the ul-
timate sovereign authority,38 one might argue that the state is bound 
both to respect the individual choices of citizens in religious matters 
(personal freedom of conscience) and also to honor the historic, col-
lective choice of the national group.39 
Social contract theory proceeds from the assumption that “all 
men are naturally free and equal, and that they could have only 
formed a society by their own volition. Accordingly it was commonly 
held that though men were naturally inclined for life in society, and 
in fact needed it, they must create society by a deliberate act.”40 
When “individuals agree to surrender certain freedoms” the “foun-
 
 37. Commenting on the work of Will Kymlicka, Riccardo Guastini pointed out,  
States cannot be neutral towards cultures as they are supposed to be towards relig-
ions. This is so since no culture can survive if its language is not “the language of 
the government”—“when the government decides the language of public schooling, 
it is providing what is probably the most important form of support needed by so-
cietal cultures.” More generally, “government decisions on languages, internal 
boundaries, public holidays, and state symbols unavoidably involve recognizing, ac-
commodating, and supporting the needs and identities of particular ethnic and na-
tional groups.” 
Riccardo Guastini, Kymlicka’s Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal View, in THE LAW OF 
RELIGIOUS IDENTITY: MODELS FOR POST-COMMUNISM 68 (Andras Sajo and Shlomo Avineri 
eds., 1999). 
 38. KONST. RF art. 3. 
 39. While the Preamble to the Constitution has no juridical value, it does reflect the 
societal attitudes of the framers. The use of the term “sud’ba” (fate, destiny) implies that the 
Russian people are more than a random collection of individuals who happen to inhabit a par-
ticular geographic entity that exists as a political community, but share some sort of overarch-
ing common goals and values that provide a defined identity. Aleksei Vasiliev makes reference 
to this mindset when, in discussing Russia’s special place between East and West, he notes: 
Historically, the Russians are not only of Slavonic “blood,” but also Finno-Ugric 
and Turkic. There are common elements in music, dance, ornaments, poetry, ethnic 
character, and psychology. . . .  
  . . . .  
  . . . Russia herself formed first as a multiethnic and then as a multi-confessional 
country. Many contemporary scholars hold that some of her inhabitants . . . , given 
their linguistic, ethnic, religious and even racial diversity, have acquired common 
features and developed a common cultural stratum, way of life and style of behav-
ior.” 
Aleksei Vasiliev, Russia’s Destinies and Islam, in THE CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM FRONTIER, supra 
note 31, at 24–25. 
 40. J.W. GOUGH, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: A CRITICAL STUDY OF ITS DEVELOPMENT 
81 (2d ed. 1957). 
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dation of a political society” can be laid, by which each person gives 
his consent to be bound by certain rules and regulations, to a code 
of behavior.41 Traditionally, the “social contract” was described as an 
actual historical event. Over time, in Western political thought (fol-
lowing the line taken by the philosopher Immanuel Kant), the con-
tract was put forward not as historical reality, but as “idea of reason.” 
Therefore, as Kant concluded; “political rights and duties should be 
ordered ‘as if’ political obligation were founded on a contract. . .”42 
In either case, as R. L. Nettleship pointed out, 
The conception of an original contract upon which society is based 
. . . is, emphatically, unhistorical . . . , but it has been not the less 
influential. . . . It is based upon a very important fact, that every 
civilized community, perhaps any real community, requires, in or-
der that it may exist at all, a mutual recognition of rights on the 
part of its members. . . . [T]he potency of the idea lies not in the 
fictitious historical account it gives of the matter, but in the real 
present truth it expresses.43 
The story of the conversion of ancient Rus’ to Orthodox Christi-
anity, as presented in the Chronicle of Bygone Years,44 contains within 
it the seeds of two “social contract” interpretations of the relation-
ship of the Russian nation to Orthodox Christianity. Even if the ac-
count itself is fictitious in nature, its very presence in what is set forth 
as literal history is meant to guide readers to reach the conclusions 
that the choice made by Russian society at the close of the tenth cen-
tury is both logical and proper. Social contract theory operates on 
one of two premises: 1) either, at some point in the past, a formal 
contract had been drawn up and approved that is subsequently rati-
fied by social acquiescence of succeeding generations (e.g., the U.S. 
Constitution); or 2) the status quo is presented as “one that a suita-
bly placed agent could rationally have contracted into.”45 
The narrative opens in A.D. 986 with the visit of missionaries of 
various world religions to Vladimir, the Grand Prince of Rus’. Prior 
 
 41. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1395 (7th ed. 1999). 
 42. GOUGH, supra note 40, at 244. 
 43. R.L. NETTLESHIP, LECTURES ON THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO 52–53 (2d ed. 1901), 
quoted in GOUGH, supra note 40, at 245–46. 
 44. The text from which I will be citing will be the Commission version of the Nov-
gorod Chronicle, found in NOVGORODSKAIA PERVAIA LETOPIS’ 104 (A.N. Nasonova ed., 
1950) [hereinafter NPL]. 
 45. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 354 (7th ed. 1999). 
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to this point, Russia, as a society, was largely undefined in religious 
matters, which is why, in part, missionaries from various world faiths 
had arrived, hoping to convert people to their particular religion. 
Then begins the “test” of faiths, with Vladimir evaluating the merits 
of each faith not only for himself personally, but for Russian society 
as a whole.46 By recording this event, the chroniclers invited their 
readers to hypothetically place themselves in Vladimir’s position and 
to evaluate his conclusions.47 
However, Vladimir does not make the decision on the merits of 
his own authority. The chronicle records that after dismissing the 
various missionaries, he was “desiring to test all the faiths” and, 
therefore, he was not yet prepared to commit to a specific course of 
action.48 Not willing to act unilaterally, “Vladimir assembled his no-
bles [boiars] and the elders of the city.”49 The elders of the city were 
the elected representatives of the assembly (the veche), which com-
prised all free-born citizens of the city. This assembly was considered 
to be the source of sovereign authority over the entire community. 
Therefore, the meeting of such an assembly was a universal and 
“necessary phenomenon” needed to confer legitimacy on any gov-
ernment or administration.50 Vladimir’s convocation of this assembly 
was designed to legitimize the choice of a new faith for society, with 
the assembly of the capital city, in essence, acting as a virtual repre-
sentative of the entire commonwealth and empowered to act on its 
behalf. 
Having presented to this assembly everything that the missionar-
ies of the various faiths had told him, Vladimir then asked them: 
“And what do you give your minds over to, and what do you an-
swer?” And the nobles and the elders said, “You know, O Prince, 
that no one disparages his own things, but praises them; but if you 
 
 46. NPL, supra note 44, at 132–148. 
 47. Nearly a thousand years later, in the second part of his manifesto, “The Common 
Task,” Russian philosopher Nikolai Fedorov would repeat Vladimir’s “test of the faiths” as an 
intellectual exercise to convince his readers of the wisdom of the choice of Orthodox Christian-
ity. See GEORGE M. YOUNG, JR., NIKOLAI F. FEDOROV: AN INTRODUCTION 145 (1979). 
 48. NPL, supra note 44, at 148. 
 49. Id. 
 50. M. TIKHOMIROV, THE TOWNS OF ANCIENT RUS 233 (1959). As historian George 
Vernadsky noted, “The town meeting was a universal institution in old Russia, both in the cit-
ies and in the rural districts. . . . In normal times it concurred with the prince and the boyar 
council in all major matters of legislation and general administration.” GEORGE VERNADSKY, 
KIEVAN RUSSIA 185–86 (1976). 
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wish to test surely, you have at your [disposal] men, send them to 
examine [test] each service and how each serves God.” And this 
speech was liked by the prince and all the people, and they chose 
men wise and learned, by number ten.51 
What the chroniclers are laying out is a situation by which the 
sovereign authorities of the land, representing collectively the peo-
ple, having themselves been vested with power—in theory, by the 
will of the people—are in turn empowering an elected commission 
to go out and examine the world’s religions and to make a binding 
recommendation upon their return. In other words, one can argue, 
based upon a reading of the text, that each individual transferred his 
right of free choice to the collective, empowering it to act upon his 
behalf, and that the proper authorities of the collective will, in turn, 
devolve that authority upon the commission to act on their behalf. 
The text is quite clear that the selection of the commission was by 
the choice of both the prince and the people. 
Such an interpretation—that the commission was empowered to 
act for society as a whole and not simply to choose a faith for them-
selves personally—seems tenable based upon the narrative following 
the return of the commission. Having presented its report in favor of 
adopting the form of Christianity practiced by the Byzantine (East 
Roman) Empire, Vladimir, addressing the assembly, posed the ques-
tion, “And where shall we be baptized?” The council thereupon 
vested Vladimir with authority to make the arrangements.52 It is also 
supported by the later testimony of the common people, who, upon 
being presented with Vladimir’s order to present themselves for bap-
tism, noted, “If this were not a good thing, then our prince and his 
nobles would not have received it.”53 
To be Russian, therefore, was to be an Orthodox Christian; it 
was an integral part of one’s membership in the community, not 
subject to individual choice. Such attitudes remain strong even at the 
beginning of the twenty-first century. As the State Department’s an-
nual report on international religious freedom for 2000 pointed out: 
“Many Russians firmly believe that at least nominal adherence to the 
Russian Orthodox Church is at the heart of what it means to be  
 
 
 51. NPL, supra note 44, at 148 (emphasis added). 
 52. Id. at 150. 
 53. Id. at 156. 
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Russian, and Russian Orthodoxy is considered in conservative na-
tionalist circles as the de facto official religion of the country.”54 
Therefore, traditionally in Russia, religious freedom was the right 
of other nations resident within the territory of the Russian state to 
maintain their own distinctive “social contract.” In a number of areas 
in medieval Russia, some degree of religious toleration, based upon 
the communal principle, flourished.55 In the city-state republic of 
Novgorod as well as in other communes in northern Russia, religious 
minorities were organized as parish communities with distinct wards, 
governed by their own officials and under their own laws. 
Novgorod, for example, politically defined itself as a corporate 
community in terms of the Orthodox cathedral of the city, St. 
Sophia. Then within Novgorod, there existed two other separate 
communities to facilitate the residence of non-Orthodox persons in 
the city: the Gotlanders’ “Gothic Yard,” built around their Church 
of St. Olaf, which was a Scandinavian enclave; and the “German 
Yard,” known as the court of St. Peter, after the name of the Catho-
lic parish of that city. Each of these “courts” had its own living quar-
ters, offices, and storage areas, and each was governed by its own 
laws and regulations. Reciprocal arrangements existed so that in the 
Catholic city of Visby, the Orthodox Novgorodians possessed their 
own Orthodox church and district governed by its own rules.56 The 
A.D. 1229 treaty guaranteed that the non-Orthodox in Novgorod 
had full rights of residency (if not of political citizenship). If a dis-
pute broke out between citizens of the two “communities,” e.g., a 
Catholic German and an Orthodox Russian, a mechanism for the 
settlement of such a dispute was provided, with representative of 
both communities meeting on “neutral” ground, in the yard the 
Church of St. John, which, while an Orthodox place of worship, was 
close to the “German Yard” and was associated with them, forming a 
meeting-point between the larger Orthodox community of  
 
 
 54. 2000 ANNUAL REPORT: RUSSIA, supra note 33. 
 55. This was especially noteworthy in pre-Mongol Russia in cities like Kiev, Ladoga, 
Polotsk, Smolensk, and Pereyaslavl. See Ambrosius Pogodin, On the Question of the Order of 
Reception of Persons into the Orthodox Church, Coming to Her from Other Christian Churches, 
VESTNIK RUSSKOGO KHRISTIANSKOGO DVIZHENIYA, no. 173 (I-1996) at 1 (Alvian N. 
Smirensky trans., 2000) (visited Jan. 16, 2001) <http://www.holytrinity.org/ecclesiol-
ogy/pogodin-reception/reception-ch2.html>. 
 56. HENRIK BIRNBAUM, LORD NOVGOROD THE GREAT 50, 97, 121 (1981). 
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Novgorod and the residents of Novgorod who were “citizens” of 
another “community”—that is, the Roman Catholic Church. 57 
For an individual to change confessions, in theory, he or she 
would also have to exchange identities, and leave one socio-political 
community for another. That is to say, a person could exercise free 
choice in religion only by the right of exit from one social commu-
nity and through affiliation to another. In practice, this right was 
rarely exercised. This view, when a person changes his religious af-
filiation, that a person is thus leaving one community for another, is 
expressed in the twelfth century “Questions to Kirik,” about the pro-
cedure by which a non-Orthodox in Russia should be joined to the 
Orthodox community: 
If a Latin wishes to come under Russian law, let him attend our 
Church. . . . He is to be given a new name. . . . Then let him bathe 
in the bathhouse. . . . Four prayers must be read over him. He is 
dressed in clean clothes. A crown or a wreath is placed on his 
head.58 
The actions in this ritual—bathing, being given a new name, and 
fresh clothes—are all symbols of rebirth. By changing faiths, a person 
“died” to his old community and was “reborn” into the new “social 
contract” of the community of his choice. 
Throughout the imperial period, most tsarist proclamations of 
religious toleration for non-Orthodox groups, be they Muslims, Lu-
therans, Catholics, or others, were generally given to ethnic-national 
communities in specific geographic areas rather than all individual 
citizens throughout the state. One of the best examples of this is the 
toleration extended to the Vygovskaia Pustyn’, a settlement of Old 
Believers (dissenters from the official church) in northern Russia. 
The Vyg community enjoyed local self-government and the right to 
retain its own forms of worship and life. (Similar contracts were 
reached with other old believer communities such as the Grebenskii 
cossacks of the Caucasus). The Vyg community was also able to ac-
quire legal title to land in other provinces, and its agents and busi-
nessmen could travel freely and retain the rights to perform their 
 
 57. Adapted from 2 URKUNDLICHE GESCHICHTE DES URSPRUNGES DER DEUTSCHEN 
HANSE 29 (G.F. Sartorius ed., 1830), reprinted in A SOURCE BOOK FOR MEDIEVAL 
ECONOMIC HISTORY 225–31 (Roy C. Cave & Herbert H. Coulson eds., photo. reprint 1965) 
(1936). 
 58. See Pogodin, supra note 55. 
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own religion even outside of the community. Moreover, the Vy-
govskaia Pustyn’ was vested with the authority to issue passports for 
its own members.59 In short, the community was constituted as an 
autonomous community within the boundaries of the Russian state 
defined by religious identity. 
The communal interpretation of religious expression also 
strongly influenced nineteenth-century Slavophile concepts dealing 
with freedom of conscience. In 1860, the Slavophiles addressed an 
open letter “To the Serbians,” advising them, as fellow Orthodox 
Slavs, how they should approach the issue of religious freedom: 
Let there be everywhere complete freedom of Faith and its profes-
sion! Let no one endure oppression or persecution concerning mat-
ters of knowledge of God or worship! . . . That’s why the person of 
a different faith must be like your guest, protected from every injus-
tice and enjoying all your rights in private life, but on public mat-
ters he should not be a full-fledged citizen with the other broth-
ers . . . , passing judgment together with his brothers on public 
matters. God saved you from internal dissent; do not admit such 
dissent in the very depths of the people’s conscience and in the 
public spirit . . . we think that they cannot be offended by such ex-
clusion, and they themselves, out of love for you, would not wish 
to bring the seeds of discord and dissent to your society.60 
Commenting on the situation in Russia at the beginning of the 
twentieth century, Donald Mackenzie Wallace wrote: 
[I]t seems to a Russian in the nature of things that Tartars should 
be Mahometans [Muslims], that Poles should be Roman Catholics, 
and that Germans should be Protestants; and the mere act of be-
coming a Russian subject is not supposed to lay the Tartar, the 
Pole, or the German under any obligation to change his faith.61 
These nationalities are therefore allowed the most perfect freedom 
in the exercise of their respective religions, so long as they refrain  
 
 
 59. See ROBERT O. CRUMMEY, THE OLD BELIEVERS AND THE WORLD OF ANTICHRIST: 
THE VYG COMMUNITY AND THE RUSSIAN STATE 1694–1855, at 68–74 (1970). 
 60. Quoted in Peter K. Christoff, 1 AN INTRODUCTION TO NINETEENTH-CENTURY 
RUSSIAN SLAVOPHILISM: A STUDY IN IDEAS 254 (1961). 
 61. The pre-revolutionary Russian Empire was quite diverse religiously, with some 65% 
Orthodox Christians, 10% Old Believers, 8% Catholics, 4.5% Protestants, 6% Muslims, and 4% 
Jewish. Aleksandr Shchipkov, Interreligious Relations in Russia After 1917, in PROSELYTISM 
AND ORTHODOXY IN RUSSIA: THE NEW WAR FOR SOULS 84 (John Witte, Jr. & Michael Bour-
deaux eds., 1999). 
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from disturbing by propagandism the divinely established order of 
things. 
 This is the received theory, and we must do the Russians the jus-
tice to say that they habitually act up to it. If the Government has 
sometimes attempted to convert alien races, the motive has always 
been political, and the efforts have never awakened much sympathy 
among the people at large, or even among the clergy. In like man-
ner the missionary societies which have sometimes been formed in 
imitation of the Western nations have never received much popular 
support. Thus with regard to aliens this peculiar theory has led to 
very extensive religious toleration. With regard to the Russians 
themselves the theory has had a very different effect. If in the na-
ture of things the Tartar is a Mahometan, the Pole a Roman 
Catholic, and the German a Protestant, it is equally in the nature of 
things that the Russian should be a member of the Orthodox 
Church. On this point the written law and public opinion are in 
perfect accord. If an Orthodox Russian becomes a Roman Catholic 
or a Protestant, he is amenable to the criminal law, and is at the 
same time condemned by public opinion as an apostate and rene-
gade—almost as a traitor.62 
In other words, each national community has its own particu-
larly-suited form of religious expression and worship, and while indi-
viduals are free to dissent, the community also has the right to ex-
clude dissidents from communal life, while the state exists to grant to 
each distinctive group the right to order its own spiritual and cultural 
life. Even in the post-Soviet period, there remains a strong consensus 
that religious freedom means that each component of the “multina-
tional people” of the Russian Federation (as defined in Article 3 of 
the Constitution) has the right to practice its own “traditional” relig-
ion. Thus, it was expected that Catholicism in Russia would be iden-
tified with Poles and Lithuanians, various Protestant groups with 
Germans or Latvians, Islam with Tatars and Bashkirs, and so on.63 
To what extent, however, in post-Soviet Russia, can we speak of 
distinctive ethno-religious groupings? After seventy years of Soviet 
nationality policy, which emphasized not only the sblizhenie (drawing 
 
 62. DONALD MACKENZIE WALLACE, RUSSIA (1905) (visited Jan. 16, 2001) 
<http://www2.cddc.vt.edu/gutenberg/etext98/rsdmw10.txt>, ch. 17, at ∗177. 
 63. Shchipkov, supra note 61, at 80–82, 90–91; see also Sergei Filatov and Lyudmila 
Vorontsova, Russian Catholicism: Relic or Reality?, in PROSELYTISM AND ORTHODOXY, supra 
note 61, at 98. 
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together) but also the sliianie (merger) of all national groups, many 
of the pre-revolutionary distinctions have been erased. Implicit in 
such policies was the breaking down of cultural and linguistic barri-
ers.64 The resulting increase in the use of Russian among all nation-
alities has meant that a number of these religious denominations that 
formally might have held services in the “ethnic” language (e.g. 
German in Lutheran congregations) are now using the modern Rus-
sian vernacular; in turn, this means that such services are now as ac-
cessible to ethnic Russians (and other nationalities). As a result, as 
Aleksandr Shchipkov pointed out, “Religious beliefs are now less and 
less linked with national identity, so it is difficult to define the geo-
graphical borders of a particular faith.”65 In particular, the Roman 
Catholic Church as well as a number of Protestant Churches histori-
cally connected to specific ethnic groups (Germans, Ingrians, Kare-
lians, etc.) are now drawing in members from outside their tradi-
tional ethnic base. 66 Can one speak of a “traditional” religion for a 
child whose father is a Russified Tatar and whose mother is Yakut? 
One cannot also speak of any sort of “geographic” particularism for 
specific faiths, because industrialization and urbanization have cre-
ated multiethnic, multiconfessional cities.67 
The communal understanding of religious freedom, therefore, is 
becoming increasingly irrelevant in the contemporary Russian Fed-
eration. Even if the Constitution would be altered to enshrine this 
particular view, Russia today is not divided into neat cities and dis-
tricts based on ethno-religious groups, nor is it feasible to expect that 
converts from one faith to another should relocate to join with their 
fellow co-religionists. One can also argue that the “all-
Russian/political-Russian” people (rossiiskii narod) is by definition 
an areligious grouping, having no common faith traditions, and is 
instead an amalgamation of all the peoples and confessions to be 
found living within the territory of the Russian state. However, what 
remains unclear is to what degree (among ethnic Russians) other 
faiths, such as Pentecostalism or Methodism or Catholicism, will be-
 
 64. GORDON B. SMITH, SOVIET POLITICS: CONTINUITY AND CONTRADICTION 308–
10 (1988). 
 65. Shchipkov, supra note 61, at 81. 
 66. Id. at 81–92; see also Filatov & Vorontsova, supra note 63, at 98, 105; Sergei Fila-
tov, Protestantism in Postsoviet Russia: An Unacknowledged Triumph, 28 RELIGION, STATE & 
SOCIETY 93, 93–104 (2000). 
 67. See Shchipkov, supra note 61, at 84, for his discussion of St. Petersburg. 
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come socially accepted alongside Orthodoxy as “Russian faiths” 
(russkie very). This will increasingly be linked to the question of 
whether “Russian” (russkii) identity will be defined pluralistically or 
continue to be interpreted through the prism of the Orthodox ex-
perience. Such issues are unlikely to be decided at the constitutional 
level. 
One argument that has not, as of yet, made much headway in 
Russian discourse on this issue is to suggest that the enshrining of 
the right of individual free conscience in the Russian Constitution 
has, to all intensive purposes, dissolved the pre-existing “social con-
tract” linking Orthodoxy with the Russian nation, and therefore all 
Russian citizens are free to repeat Vladimir’s “test of the faiths” for 
themselves as individuals and to make their own minds. Therefore, 
the 1993 Constitution, representing a more recent “social contract” 
between individuals, society, and the government, gives the right of 
choice in religious beliefs back to the individual. 
At the same time, however, Orthodoxy, having been the religion 
of the majority of the Russian nation for the past millennium, has 
shaped and molded many areas of Russian cultural, spiritual, and po-
litical life. It would be nigh impossible to separate what is “religious” 
from what is not; are Rachmaninoff’s liturgical compositions, for ex-
ample, religious or cultural? Would performance of that Orthodox 
liturgical music by state-sponsored cultural organs constitute a viola-
tion of religious freedom or compromise the “secular” nature of the 
government? What of the Orthodox churches which stand in the 
Kremlin—must they be shut down or deconsecrated as part of the 
constitutional provisions declaring Russia a “secular” state? Such 
measures are highly unlikely. The government cannot constitution-
ally mandate that Orthodoxy be stripped from Russian culture. In 
recognition of this reality, a number of other religious organizations, 
such as some pastors from the Seventh-Day Adventist Church, for 
example, seek to find those elements from the dominant Russian-
Orthodox culture which are compatible with their own specific reli-
gious views.68 Again, this is an issue which ultimately lies outside the 
scope of constitutional law. 
 
 
 68. Mikhail M. Kulakov, Seventh-Day Adventists, in PROSELYTISM AND ORTHODOXY, 
supra note 61, at 153. 
5GVO-FIN.DOC 6/25/01  9:11 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2001 
534 
III. CONCLUSIONS: FRAMING UNIQUELY RUSSIAN ARGUMENTS TO 
SUPPORT RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN RUSSIA 
To some extent, the weakness of the “rule of law” in post-Soviet 
Russia makes appeals to executives and judges based on constitu-
tional principles largely an academic exercise, but, over time, as ef-
forts are made to strengthen the role of law, it is important that 
precedents be set down in Russian jurisprudence. Moreover, such 
appeals can also help to shape and sway public opinion. Whenever 
possible, those working for religious freedom should avoid citing 
Western (especially American) precedents or international treaties 
when framing their arguments, so as to avoid giving the impression 
that they are advocating positions that are not in harmony with es-
tablished Russian laws and constitutional traditions. Nor should cur-
rent advocates be hesitant to cite incidents from Russian history and 
pre-revolutionary legislation in pointing to previous and relevant 
precedents from the past.69 
The loopholes in the current Constitution—and the contradic-
tions they create—must be squarely addressed. If citizens have a 
right to freedom of belief, to act on those beliefs, and to do so in 
conjunction with others, as Article 28 proclaims, then this should 
form the basis for defining what constitutes a “religious association.” 
Moreover, since many religions enjoin their members to preach, 
teach, engage in charity, and have a public witness, it must be argued 
that curtailing such rights to members of certain faiths (instead of 
regulation of such activities, which would be binding on all citizens, 
believers and non-believers alike) is a violation of their right to free-
dom of belief if they are prevented from acting on those beliefs. Now 
that calls are being heard at the highest levels of the Russian gov-
ernment for revision of or even a complete replacement of the exist-
ing Constitution, there exists an opportunity for legislators, human 
rights activists, and scholars to clarify precisely the implications of Ar-
ticle 28 for corporate religious organizations. 
Advocates for religious freedom must be bolder in claiming Rus-
sian history as support for religious liberty. The example of Prince 
Vladimir “testing the faiths” and being able, not only to send forth 
his servants to gather information, but also to receive in his own pal-
 
 69. In the United States, Supreme Court decisions regularly take into account historical 
and cultural factors that predate the framing of the U.S. Constitution in 1787. See generally 
Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
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ace missionaries of diverse faiths, must be held up as an important 
part of Russian history. What Vladimir did a millennium ago on be-
half of his people is a right today that every individual Russian citizen 
possesses—to search out truth. In this light, the conversion of Rus-
sians to any particular confession should not be viewed as being 
“treasonous” to Russian history or culture, but a continuation of the 
process begun by Vladimir and an emulation of his behavior. Advo-
cates should also not be hesitant in citing relevant legal precedents 
from Russia’s past, including the decrees on religious toleration en-
acted by Tsar Peter I (which contained a strong affirmation of the 
principle of religious freedom, albeit within the context of inviting 
foreigners to Russia) as well as the 1905 Decree issued by Tsar 
Nicholas II. The historic toleration of non-Orthodox groups within 
the Russian Empire (albeit in a communal rather than individual 
fashion) belies notions that Russia historically was a mono-religious 
society. 
Arguments for religious liberty should avoid moving into areas 
that deal with questions of national identity and culture. As Law-
rence Uzzell of the Keston Institute has pointed out, it is not incon-
sistent with religious liberty in Russia to also have a formal acknowl-
edgement that the Orthodox Church (for ethnic Russians, at least) 
has traditionally been the “bearer of cultural identity and moral le-
gitimacy” in society.70 The critical area should be to argue that the 
provision in the 1997 Law (Article 8.5) that restricts the use of the 
word “Russia” or “Russian” (that is, the political terms used to des-
ignate the Russian state and citizens of that state, Rossiia and ros-
siiskii) to groups that can demonstrate their existence on Russian soil 
for more than fifty years confuses the distinction of what pertains to 
Russia as an ethnic community versus the totality of Russia as a po-
litical entity. It should be argued that any group that exists within 
the territorial bounds of the Russian Federation and is subject to its 
political authority in temporal matters is ipso facto “Russian” (ros-
siiskii). Since these political terms do not carry national-ethnic con-
notations, there can be no charge that “nontraditional” religions are 
trying to appropriate the cultural legacy of ethnic Russians or of any 
of the other nationalities of the Federation. Groups should not have 
to demonstrate their “Russian-ness” to be able to operate, nor, on 
 
 70. Lawrence A. Uzzell, Guidelines for American Missionaries in Russia, in 
PROSELYTISM AND ORTHODOXY, supra note 61, at 330. 
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the other hand, should they attempt to alter traditional definitions 
by which most Russians define their national identity. Instead, a 
greater focus on the “Russian-ness” (rossiiskii) of groups, based upon 
organizational and legal criteria, is what is required. Orthodoxy may 
be the traditional religion of ethnic Russians (russkie), or Islam that 
of Bashkirs, but the emphasis should be on obtaining a precedent 
that there is no such thing as a traditional religion that is binding on 
all Russian citizens (rossiane). Russian citizens, members of the po-
litical community called Russia—rossiane—(as opposed to the ethnic 
community of Russians), should be informed that to be Orthodox, 
Muslim, Baptist, Methodist, or atheist are all equally valid choices. 
